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The Effect of Competitive Advertising Interference on Sales for Packaged Goods 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Competitive advertising interference arises when viewers of advertising for a focal 
brand are also exposed to advertising messages for competing brands within a short time 
period, say one week for TV advertising. Although competitive advertising interference has 
been shown to reduce ad recall and recognition and brand evaluation measures, no studies 
have examined the impact on sales. In this research we use a market response model of sales 
for two grocery categories in the Chicago area to investigate possible advertising interference 
effects. The results show that competitive interference effects are strong. When one or more 
competing brands advertise in the same week as the focal brand, the advertising elasticity 
diminishes for the focal brand. The rate of decrease depends on the number of competing 
brands advertising in a particular week and their total GRPs broadcast. We are able to derive 
optimal advertising levels for the brands within a category so that they all have the maximum 
sales response from advertising. It transpires that the current level of television advertising 
within the two categories is much higher than this optimum level, indicating that these 
grocery brands are likely to be over advertising at present. Curtailing advertising for all the 
brands would increase the response to advertising for each of them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1997 television advertising expenditure in the US was $42 billion. Only 5 years 
later expenditure was over $58 billion, a 38% increase, being well above inflation levels 
during this period (www.adage.com). Increased spending on television advertising has 
resulted in a higher proportion of nonprogram material, now running at over 16 minutes per 
hour in prime time (Electronic Media 2002). Nonprogram minutes in daytime television is 
even higher, being nearly 21 minutes each hour.  
The downstream effect of increased advertising on television viewers is obvious; they 
are exposed to many more ads, potentially reducing advertising effectiveness. For example, 
recent industry evidence from Europe shows that advertising recall is lower in countries with 
higher levels of television advertising. Specifically, Byfield and Nazaroff (2003) report that 
in Denmark, where there are only 80 average TV exposures per week per person, the 
Millward Brown awareness index is 150 (compared with the UK benchmark of 100). 
However, in Italy, where there are 300 average exposures per week per person, the average 
awareness index drops to only 50. Clearly one effect of increasing advertising levels is to 
decrease the recall of all ads. Academic studies have also found lower ad recall and 
recognition in the presence of too much advertising from competitors (Burke and Srull 1988; 
D’Souza and. Rao 1995; Keller 1987; 1991). Increasing advertising content on television is 
also increasing ad avoidance behavior (Danaher 1995; Lafayette 2004; Yorke and Kitchen 
1985; Van Meurs 1998), such as channel switching or time-shift viewing with a PVR (Green 
2003). 
A commonly used term to describe high levels of advertising is ‘clutter’. For 
television, clutter is the combination of commercials and other nonprogram material, such as 
program promotions and public service announcements. The increase in clutter over the past 
40 years is due to both an increase in nonprogram time and an increase in the number of 15 
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second commercials (Brown and Rothschild 1993; Kent 1995). The topic of increasing 
advertising clutter is one of the most publicized issues in the advertising trade literature and 
continues to be one of the biggest concerns facing the advertising industry (Chunovic 2003; 
Lafayette 2004). 
Kent (1993) makes a distinction between competitive and noncompetitive clutter. 
Competitive clutter, which is also called ‘competitive interference’ (Burke and Srull 1988; 
Kent and Allen 1994), is clutter that arises from ads delivered by competing brands at or near 
the same time and place as those for a focal brand. Kent (1993; 1995) finds that competitive 
clutter has a more harmful affect on ad recall than noncompetitive clutter. In this study we 
focus on just competitive clutter. 
Most previous research on advertising interference has been restricted to student 
samples with subjects exposed to commercials in a laboratory setting (Burke and Srull 1988; 
Keller 1991; Kent and Allen 1994), resulting in low external validity. A further limitation is 
the use of unfamiliar brands, which Kent and Allen (1994) show are more prone to 
interference effects. Lastly, all the previous marketing studies have looked at the effect of 
competitive interference on recall, recognition or brand evaluations rather than the all-
important effect on sales (East 2003, p. 19). The purpose of this paper is to make up for these 
shortcomings by examining the effect of competitive interference on sales for well-known 
brands within two grocery categories in a major U.S. metropolitan market. 
 
RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
The prevalence of competitive clutter in U.S. television is evidenced by Kent (1995), 
who reports that in daytime network TV about 31 ads are broadcast per hour. Furthermore, 
depending on the network, somewhere between 19 and 29 percent of ads have a competitive 
commercial aired within the same hour on the same channel. This percentage rises to between 
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23 and 35 percent during prime time, although fewer ads are broadcast in this time zone. 
Obviously, over a longer time period, such as a week, most ads will be subject to interference 
effects from their competitors. 
The harmful effect of such high competitive clutter on consumer advertising response 
has been known to marketers for some time (Bettman 1979; Bagozzi and Silk 1983). While 
early experimental work by Webb (1979) demonstrates that increased clutter levels reduce 
brand name recall, Brown and Rothschild (1993) found no such reduction. The important 
distinction between these two studies and the work of Burke and Srull (1988), D’Souza and. 
Rao (1995) and Keller (1987; 1991) is that Webb (1979) and Brown and Rothschild (1993) 
do not have any competitive advertising in their experiments. Hence, a key environmental 
factor on the effect of clutter is the presence of competing advertising.  
When explaining the reason for the drop in advertising effectiveness due to 
competitive interference it is important to distinguish between the role of time and the role of 
interference by other learning. Time effects, such as advertising decay or wearout (Axelrod 
1980) are often incorporated in advertising response models (e.g., Little 1979; Lodish 1971). 
However, the passing of time is not the only reason for a decrease in advertising response. 
Early experiments in psychology, that have controlled for time effects, suggest that much of 
the “forgetting” is due to additional learning, rather than time passing (McGeoch 1932).   
Thus, information from advertising can be “unlearned” because of subsequent 
exposure to competing brands’ messages.  This is known as retroactive, as opposed to 
proactive, interference (Bagozzi and Silk 1983; Burke and Srull 1988).  Burke and Srull 
(1988) find that aided recall for a focal brand’s advertising is lower, both prior and 
subsequent to exposure to advertising from competing brands. Keller (1987) finds that 
proactive competitive interference also inhibits ad and brand recall, but could not 
demonstrate any impact of competitive interference on brand evaluations (being ad and brand 
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attitude and purchase intentions). However, a follow up experiment by Keller (1991) was 
able to demonstrate the detrimental effects of competitive interference on brand evaluations. 
His study also showed that interference effects are alleviated by using advertising retrieval 
cues in the form of executional information from the original ad.  
Interference effects are generally perceived as deleterious to advertising effectiveness, 
but in a recent study Jewell and Unnava (2003) exploited interference effects in the situation 
where a brand is trying to promote a new or modified attribute. The competing 
advertisements help consumers ‘forget’ the previously advertised attributes for the focal 
brand.  In this unusual setting, advertising interference is, in fact, rather helpful. 
Previous research on competitive interference has a number of limitations, which we 
now detail. First, Burke and Srull (1988), Keller (1987; 1991) and Kent and Allen (1994) all 
used student samples or convenience samples in a near forced-exposure situation in a 
laboratory setting. Second, these same studies exposed subjects to just commercials, without 
embedding them in a realistic media viewing environment with program or editorial material. 
Therefore, subjects are likely to pay more attention to commercials when they have few or no 
environmental distractions or competing visual entertainment, such as a program. Third, 
previous experimental work has allowed either one or up to only 3 or 4 competitive ads per 
brand, whereas actual exposure levels in today’s TV environment are generally much higher 
(Kent 1995). Fourth, Kent and Allen (1994) identify that a further external validity problem 
for the studies by Burke and Srull (1988) and Keller (1987; 1991) is their use of fictitious or 
unfamiliar brands. Kent and Allen (1993; 1994) find that competitive interference effects are 
not as marked for familiar brands. Fifth, all previous experimental studies have used print or 
radio (D’Souza and. Rao 1995) rather than the television medium. Given that competitive 
clutter is commonly associated with television, it is apparent that work needs to be done on 
this high spend medium. Lastly, all previous studies have looked at the effect of competitive 
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interference on recall, recognition or brand evaluations rather than sales1. Sales, as a criterion 
for advertising effectiveness is clearly of much interest to advertisers (East 2003, p. 19).  
Our research aims to correct for the limitations of previous research. Specifically, we 
use actual weekly sales and spot TV advertising data for the Chicago area in 1991.We 
examine seven brands in the liquid laundry detergent category and 18 brands in the ready to 
eat cereal category. Kent (1995) identified these two categories as being among the top ten 
categories with the most competitive clutter. Additionally, we use Nielsen television ratings 
data for this period to establish the weekly audience size (measured in gross rating points) for 
each brand that advertises. After demonstrating that competitive advertising reduces the 
response to advertising, we proceed to show the appropriate levels of advertising that each 
brand should have to maximize its sales. In general, this level is somewhat lower than the 
current advertising volume, indicating that brands tend to be over-advertising. 
The paper proceeds as follows. We firstly develop a sales response model suitable for 
our weekly sales data. The model allows for all the marketing mix factors that potentially 
impact on sales. Second, we construct a reasonable measure of competitive clutter that allows 
for the number of competing brands that simultaneously advertise and the volume of their 
advertising. Third, we fit the model to two grocery categories and test to see if competitive 
clutter influences advertising response. Fourth, we use the fitted model to see what level of 
competitive advertising maximizes sales for a focal brand and all the brands in a category. 
We conclude with some advice about how advertisers might reduce the effects of advertising 
interference on their brands. 
 
                                                 
1 One earlier study by Metwally (1978) did look at whether competing brands react to each others TV 
advertising with the aim of maintaining market share. His study is based on just the top two brands in each of 
six Australian packaged goods categories using annual market share, price and advertising data for the period 
1960-1976. He finds that in five of the six categories competitive advertising reactions are present and tend to 
‘self cancel’. That is, for his brands, advertising appears to be used mostly to maintain market share rather than 
to stimulate sales. 
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METHOD 
 
Model Relating Marketing Effort to Sales 
 
While the primary purpose of this study is to examine the effect of competitive 
advertising on sales we cannot ignore the effects of other marketing factors on sales.  Our 
model must also be tailored to the data, which is weekly scanner data spanning a one year 
period.  For instance a multinomial-logit model, as developed by Guadagni and Little (1983), 
is not appropriate here since such a model requires individual-level data.  There is a long 
history of econometric models developed for use on weekly scanner data (Leeflang et al 
2000), including several used commercially, such as SCAN*PRO (Wittink et al 1988) and 
PROMOTIONSCAN (Abraham and Lodish 1993).  Leeflang et al (2000, p.74) report that 
one of the most frequently encountered sales response models is the so-called multiplicative 
model. Here sales are related to marketing variables via the following functional form, 
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An appealing feature of the model in equation (1) is that the elasticity for the mth  covariate is 
simply mβ .  For instance, an estimate of the advertising elasticity follows directly from the 
corresponding estimated parameter. The relative magnitude of the elasticities also gives an 
indication of the relative responsiveness of consumers to alternative marketing efforts, such 
as price changes versus local area advertising.  For example, Leone & Schultz (1980) find 
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that advertising has a small, but positive effect on sales, while Blattberg et al (1995) report 
that temporary price reductions have a relatively much stronger effect.  Other frequently 
observed advertising phenomenon include diminishing returns (Simon 1970) and carryover 
effects (Leone 1995).   
With time series data of weekly sales it is reasonable to expect serial correlation from 
one week to the next (Jacobson 1990), in which case the error term in equation (1) is better 
modeled by 
ititit u+= −1ρεε , 
 
where 1|| <ρ  and itu  is a random disturbance, distributed normally with mean zero and 
variance 2σ . 
Since competitive clutter is obviously a phenomenon that permeates across the 
category as well as for individual brands, we analyze the sales data for the whole category 
together, rather than for each brand separately. That said, the average sales levels might differ 
across brands.  Furthermore, there might be unobservable brand effects for factors that are not 
measured in our data, such as the proportion of stores in the target area that stock each brand. 
Boulding (1990) suggests that a good model to simultaneously handle autocorrelation and 
brand specific effects has the following error structure 
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Combining the sales model in (1) with the error structure in (2) gives a regression-type model 
of the form 
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The iα  parameter set can be operationalized simply as B-1 dummy variables for the B brands 
in the category. 
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Our data comprise branded packaged goods sold in grocery stores. As a result, the 
covariates include factors known to affect sales such as price, in-store promotion, price 
discounts and television advertising (Blattberg 1995). Price and in-store promotions are well-
known to have a rapid and strong affect on sales (Blattberg 1995, Guadagni and Little 1983).  
In this study our primary focus is on advertising’s effect on sales, for which there has been 
considerable research in the marketing arena (see, for example, Bass and Leone 1983; 
Leeflang et al 2000; Leone and Shultz 1980). When relating advertising to downstream sales 
with time-series data there is a potential endogeneity problem. This manifests itself because 
advertising budgets for future years are often set at a fixed proportion of current-year sales 
(Leeflang et al 2000, p. 377).  One way to allow for this problem is to use a simultaneous 
equation approach, such as 2SLS or use instrumental variables (Greene 1997, p.288).  
However, in our case, we have weekly rather than annual data, where it is much less likely 
that endogeneity issues will arise (Leeflang et al 2000, p. 382).  For this reason, we do not use 
a simultaneous equation approach here.  
Another documented effect of advertising’s impact on sales is advertising carryover 
(Clarke 1976).  Here, advertising in a previous time period affects sales in the current and 
possibly future time periods. A popular method for handling such advertising carryover is to 
use the Koyck distributed lag model (Leone 1995). Incorporating distributed lags for 
advertising with the Koyck model is inconsistent with the model in equation (3).  Instead, we 
can simply add further covariate terms in equation (3) corresponding to previous weeks of 
advertising.  In our case, advertising often comes in four week ‘bursts’ so we might 
reasonably include three lagged advertising terms among the covariates in equation (3). Later, 
we show empirically that such lagged terms are unnecessary in our two categories. 
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Clutter’s Affect on Advertising Elasticity 
We noted earlier for equation (3) that the elasticity for marketing factor m is simply 
the corresponding regression coefficientβm . Leone and Schultz (1980) report advertising 
elasticities for packaged goods in the range 0.003 to 0.23. If competitive clutter effects are 
present, we would expect attenuation in the advertising elasticity (Burke and Srull 1988; 
Keller 1987; 1991; Kent and Allen 1994). That is, a brand’s advertising elasticity becomes 
lower than it would be if none of its competitors were simultaneously advertising. Such 
advertising attenuation is expected to increase as the quantity of competitive clutter increases. 
Conversely, for low levels of competitive clutter, we expect little affect on a brand’s 
advertising elasticity. Such a situation is consistent with a reverse–S shape function which is 
easily modeled by a logistic function (Leeflang et al 2000, p.80). 
Denote the advertising elasticity in equation (3) as advβ . We model this, in turn, as a 
function of competitive clutter and a ‘pure’ advertising elasticity, that is, the advertising 
elasticity that would exist in the presence of no competitive clutter.  Specifically we have 
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where C denotes competitive clutter (to be defined later) and 21  and , γγδ are parameters to be 
estimated.   
Consider firstly the logistic function part of equation (4), namely, C
C
e
e
21
21
1 γγ
γγ
+
+
+ . When 
0=C and 41 >γ  the logistic component is greater than 0.98, being very close to 1. If 
competitive clutter effects do, in fact, attenuate advertising elasticity then 02 <γ , in which 
case the logistic component of advβ  clearly decreases to zero as C increases. When 
competitive clutter is zero and 41 >γ  we have δβ eadv ≈ . Hence, δe can be thought of as the 
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‘pure’ advertising elasticity, the sales response to advertising when no competitive clutter 
effects are present. We parameterize this ‘pure’ advertising elasticity as δe to ensure that it is 
positive, as Leone and Shultz (1980) find that advertising elasticity is usually less than 1, but 
positive, in which case we expect 0<δ .  
We also tried a simple exponential decay model for advertising elasticity, namely, 
C
adv ee 2
γδβ = , but found this did not fit the data as well as the logistic model in equation (4). 
 
Brand Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity is often observed in marketing contexts (Allenby and Rossi 1999), 
although it is usually a feature of survey or panel respondents rather than brands per se. 
However, in our setting it is reasonable to anticipate that response to price promotions and 
advertising may vary across the brands within a category. A simple way to handle this 
potential heterogeneity is to allow the mβ regression coefficients in equation (3) to be random 
effects, as is frequently assumed in a hierarchical Bayes model (Allenby and Rossi 1999). It 
might be argued that we have already allowed for differences among brands by including 
brand-level dummy variables in our model in equation (3). However, as noted above, we 
included the fixed effect brand dummy variables to allow for unobserved brand-level effects. 
Covariates like price and price cut are observed variables that might still differ across brands 
even with brand-level fixed effects included in the model. Hence, we permit the 
mβ coefficients to be random variables from a normal distribution with mean mβ , as in a 
traditional random effects model (Laird and Ware 1982). 
 
Operationalization of the Clutter Measure 
Webb and Ray (1979) and Brown and Rothschild (1993) describe television clutter as 
the sum of all nonprogram material, such as commercials, TV program promotions and 
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public service announcements. As mentioned above, we focus on just competitive clutter, 
sometimes referred to as interference (Burke and Srull 1988; Kent and Allen 1994). 
Television competitive clutter is commercials that are broadcast at the same or similar time as 
a focal brand, either accidentally or deliberately, with the intention to dilute the effectiveness 
of the focal brand. 
In a packaged goods category with B brands, clutter increases as more brands 
advertise at increasingly higher levels. One possible definition of clutter might be the total 
number of ads for the entire category that are broadcast in a particular week. However, 
suppose that just the focal brand is advertising, with no other brands advertising that week. 
Even if this brand increases its advertising to very high levels, this should not reduce its 
advertising elasticity. Certainly, there will be diminishing returns to advertising, but it is 
unlikely that sales of the brand will actually decrease when just that one brand is advertising 
heavily (Rossiter and Danaher 1998, p. 27). For this reason we conceptualize competitive 
clutter as being a feature only of competitor advertising rather than focal-brand advertising2. 
In addition, it is apparent that clutter effects will be stronger if more brands are advertising 
simultaneously (Burke and Srull 1988; D’Souza and Rao 1995; Kent and Allen 1994). For 
example, when all ten brands in a category comprised of ten brands are advertising in the 
same week, consumers will receive more confused messages than if just two of the brands 
advertise that week. Hence, competitive clutter is really a combination of the proportion of 
competitor brands advertising in the category and the total amount of advertising these brands 
deliver. Denote itC  as the competitive clutter broadcast against brand i at time t, and itA  as a 
measure of advertising volume for brand i in week t. Our measure for advertising volume is 
gross rating points (GRPs), which is the sum of ratings achieved across each advertising spot, 
                                                 
2 From a modeling point of view, it would also be problematic to have the focal brand’s advertising included in 
the C term of equation (4), since the focal brand’s advertising would then be one of the independent variables in 
the model of equation (3) and would also be present in the regression coefficient for that independent variable. 
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sometimes referred to as advertising weight. GRPs are the buying and selling currency of 
television advertising (Sissors and Baron 2002). We then define competitive clutter to be 
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where 1}{ =jtAI  if 0>jtA  , i.e., if brand j advertises in week t, and is 0 otherwise. Hence, itC  
is the product of the proportion of competing brands that are advertising and the total 
advertising volume of these competing brands. Competitive clutter will be high when a large 
proportion of competitor brands advertise at heavy levels at the same time the focal brand is 
advertising. Later we show that a model with both the proportion component of equation (5) 
and the total advertising volume component gives an improved fit compared with a model 
which contains either one of the two components. 
 In our application itC  ranges from 0.166 to 427, with a right-skewed distribution, so 
we take the log of itC  to reduce the high skew, as suggested by Mosteller and Tukey (1977).  
Therefore, our final model for the advertising elasticity in equation (4) is 
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As for price and promotion, we allow for differing advertising response across brands, by 
assuming δ is a random effect, being normally distributed with mean δ . 
 
 
SOURCES OF DATA 
Our model in equation (3) is essentially a sales response model where sales are 
modeled as a function of marketing mix covariates. To fit this model we need weekly sales 
data for each brand, along with the corresponding weekly marketing mix information, such as 
price, in-store promotion and television advertising. 
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Our approach to matching advertising to downstream sales data is to capture the 
aggregate weekly store sales across a region for each brand and simultaneously monitor the 
spot TV advertising for the same geographic region. Television viewers in the region are 
potentially exposed to a brand’s advertising (when it occurs) and this potentially stimulates 
sales in the grocery stores in the defined region. We firstly describe the source of our sales, 
price and in-store promotion data then describe the television advertising data, followed by 
the TV ratings data. 
Sales Data 
Our sales data come from the well-known Chicago supermarket chain, Dominick’s 
Finer Foods (DFF). DFF has 86 stores spread throughout the Chicago metropolitan area, 
accounting for about 20% of the region’s grocery market. Although DFF sales are not a 
census of all grocery sales in Chicago, the more relevant issue is how well DFF represents 
sales for the region. Hoch et al (1995) give a map of the distribution of DFF stores, which 
clearly shows they are spread over the length and breadth of Chicago, with concentrations in 
the more densely populated areas. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that sales from DFF 
stores are representative of grocery store sales for the Chicago metropolitan area3. 
 We examine two categories in detail, being liquid laundry detergent and ready-to-eat 
(RTE) plain cereals. Kent (1995) identified RTE cereals and household products (such as 
laundry detergent) as among the top ten categories with the highest levels of competitive 
interference. Our data cover the entire 52 weeks of 1991. The laundry detergent category has 
7 brands, while RTE cereals has 18 brands, listed respectively in Tables 1a and 1b. To 
accommodate different package sizes, the detergent sales data are based on volume sold, with 
                                                 
3Denote total weekly DFF sales for brand i in week t as itS . Since DFF sales are 20% of the entire market, total 
weekly sales across all stores is itS×5 . Hence, when reweighting the sales data all that changes in equation (3) 
is that a term )5log()1( −ρ is added to the right hand side. This is simply an adjustment of the intercept term 
and affects no other parameters in the model. 
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a standard size being IRI’s “equivalent unit” of 16 fluid ounces. For cereals, IRI’s “equivalent 
unit” is a weight of 16 ounces. The market share for the detergent brands in Table 1a is based 
on volume sales in fluid ounces, with Tide being the dominant brand in the category. With 
the larger number of brands in the cereals category, only three brands have double-digit 
market share. 
The average price for detergent is also based on IRI’s “equivalent unit” of 16 fluid 
ounces. Hence, for example, the average price of 64 fl. oz. Tide is $1.014x4 = $4.06.  We 
also include measures of each brand’s in-store promotional activities. In the data they are 
coded simply as the presence or absence of a promotion for a given SKU in a given store. To 
aggregate to the region-brand level we sum the number of promoted SKUs across each of the 
stores. For example, if in a given week, all 86 stores each promote 1 SKU of Tide with a self-
tag price reduction (often in the form of a ‘buy-one-get-some-free’ deal) the ‘bonus’ number 
is 86. The ‘price-off’ promotion variable uses the same construction as ‘bonus’, but indicates 
the presence or absence of a straightforward price discount.  
Advertising Data 
Advertising for national brands such as those in Table 1 can potentially be in media 
such as radio, magazines, newspapers and television4. Given that competitive clutter is 
considered to be a concern primarily for television, it is natural to focus attention on just this 
medium. In the case of laundry detergent and RTE cereals there are some additional reasons 
for considering just television. The LNA (1992) report of leading national advertisers for the 
year of 1991 shows that in the liquid laundry detergent category, Procter & Gamble and 
Unilever5 allocate 86% and 76%, respectively, of their total advertising budget to just 
television. Of the brands in Table 1a, only Tide has any significant non-television advertising 
                                                 
4 There might also be DFF feature advertising in local areas, but this would normally coincide with in-store 
promotions and would cover many more than just two categories. 
5 Unilever manufacture the brands All and Surf, while Procter & Gamble manufacture all of the other five 
detergent brands in Table 1a.  
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expenditure. For the RTE cereals category, the average proportion of advertising budget 
allocated to television for the five manufacturers in Table1b is 83%. This is particularly true 
for General Mills and Kelloggs, both of whose television allocation exceeds 95% of their 
combined advertising budget. Therefore, it is reasonable to use advertising data only for 
television, as it is the dominant medium for our two product categories. 
We further split television advertising into spot TV and other television advertising 
(network, syndicated and cable). We focus on just spot TV advertising data for several 
reasons. First, spot TV has much shorter purchasing lead times (two weeks to two months) 
than network TV advertising, which is typically bought 3-12 months in advance (Sissors and 
Baron 2002). This enables rapid tactical use of advertising either offensively or defensively. 
Second, spot TV permits the purchasing of particular programs and stations, whereas network 
and syndicated TV is generally bought in broad dayparts for all the affiliate stations (Katz 
2003). Therefore, with network and syndicated TV the advertiser has limited control over the 
program and advertising pod placement, making these media less attractive for competitive 
advertising. Third, network television usually has policies that reduce the amount of 
competitive interference by restricting the occurrence of ads being broadcast by competitors 
within a short time frame (Kent 1993; 1995). Fourth, cable television is omitted due to its 
fragmented audiences and low ratings. It is not a suitable medium for products with general 
appeal, such as detergents and RTE cereals. Hence, if brands want to interfere with their 
competitors’ advertising then spot TV is the ideal medium to examine. 
The LNA (1992) report does not separate out television advertising expenditure by 
individual brands, but does say how much was spent by each manufacturer. For instance, it 
reports that Procter & Gamble and Unilever allocate 28% and 30%, respectively, of their TV 
spend to spot TV. For cereals, four of the five manufacturers allocate between 20% and 30% 
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of their TV budget to spot TV. Only General Mills shows significant variance among RTE 
cereals manufacturers, by allocating 51% of its television advertising to spot TV.  
Even though spot TV represents about one-third of total television spend for these 
manufacturers, on average, a more critical issue is whether or not spot TV is representative of 
a brand’s total TV spend. If this is true, and we have no reason to doubt it, we can simply 
adjust the levels of spot TV advertising spend for each manufacturer according to the 
proportion of their total spend allocated to spot TV. For instance, this entails dividing the 
Unilever spot TV spend by 0.3 to get a reasonable estimate of its total television advertising 
levels. Later, we refit our model with adjusted advertising weight to see what effect this has 
on the parameter estimates. 
Our spot TV advertising data come from Arbitron’s television commercial monitoring 
service, the Broadcast Advertising Reports, for the same year as our sales data, namely, 1991. 
This service monitors the principle commercial TV stations continually, logging all 
advertisements and programs. Data are recorded on the time and day that each program and 
advertisement are broadcast on each station, as well as the length of each commercial. For the 
Chicago metropolitan area the Arbitron service monitors seven television stations, including 
affiliates of all four major networks. 
TV Ratings Data 
At this stage our data have only the total number of advertising spots that each brand 
broadcasts every week. Obviously not all spots carry the same weight in terms of audience 
size. In general, a late night spot will not have the same audience as one aired during prime 
time. We account for the differing impact of spots by obtaining the rating for each spot. The 
sum of these ratings is known as Gross Ratings Points (GRPs), which is the ‘currency’ for 
television advertising (Katz 2003; Sissors and Baron 2002). 
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The ratings data from Nielsen Media Research are based on a sample of about 2000 
households in the Chicago Designated Market Area. Around 375 households complete a 
quarter-hour television diary for a one week period over a four week period, giving a total of 
1500 diary households. A further 500 households have peoplemeters installed for continuous 
measurement. Data are reported across four weeks corresponding to quarterly “sweeps” in 
February, May, July and November, with a new set of 1500 diary homes recruited for each 
quarter. The February sweep is intended to cover programs shown in January, February, 
March; the May sweep covers programs shown in April, May and June, and so on. Even 
though diary-based ratings are collected only in February of the first quarter, due to the 
regularity of programming in January through March, it is reasonable to assume that ratings 
for the month of February are indicative for the entire quarter. The same is also true of the 
other quarters. 
The ratings metric we use is the proportion of households that watch a program. An 
advertisement that airs during a program is assigned the rating of that program. Since the 
quarterly sweeps do not necessarily cover the month for which we have advertising data (e.g., 
our February ratings data does not report ratings for a movie shown in January), the data may 
not reflect the actual rating for the program. In such cases, we use the average rating for the 
time slot that the program is shown. In other cases, the programming may have changed from 
the month in which the sweep was performed. In these cases we also take the typical ratings 
for that quarter. Only 250 (8%) advertising spot ratings were estimated in this way. In cases 
where an advertisement is placed in a “break” between programs, we use the average rating 
of the programs surrounding the break. 
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RESULTS 
Parameter Estimates 
 Using the marketing variables described in equation (3), with the advertising elasticity 
coefficient in equation (6), results in our final model6, given by 
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Our initial model had three lagged advertising variables (with corresponding clutter 
elasticities as in equation (6)). However, since none of these lagged advertising variables are 
significant we drop them from the model. The final model with random coefficients for 
δβββ  and ,, priceoffbonusprice was fit using WinBUGS v1.4 (Spiegelhalter et al 2003) with 
10,000 burn-in iterations and 10,000 estimation iterations over two Markov chains. The 
Gelman and Rubin (1992) statistic showed the parameter estimates converged extremely well 
to steady state values. 
The estimated parameters and their standard errors are given in Tables 2 and 3, 
respectively, for laundry detergent and RTE cereals. Since δβββ  and ,, priceoffbonusprice  are 
random effects we report the mean of their respective distributions and label these means as 
δβββ  and ,, priceoffbonusprice . All of the parameters are significant at the 5% level or lower for 
detergents and RTE cereals, apart from three of the brand dummy variable parameters for 
cereals. Turning attention to the marketing mix covariates for both categories, they all have 
the anticipated sign, with the elasticity for price being large and negative7, while those for 
bonus and price-off are positive, but much smaller in magnitude. We also note that the 
                                                 
6 We set the baseline brand dummy to be zero for Tide in the laundry detergent category and Wheaties in the 
RTE cereal category. 
7As a double check, we also tried relative price instead of own-price and obtained a very similar price elasticity. 
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parameter for serial correlation ( ρ ) is significant, although not so close to one as to raise 
concerns about non-stationarity in the time series. The overall fit of the model appears to be 
very good, as a null model with just an intercept has a log-likelihood of -591.0. This gives a 
McFadden’s (1974) 2ρ  value of %9.9859.9/591.0-1 =  for laundry detergents and               
1-86.0/1222.2=93.0% for cereals. Both are encouragingly high. 
Of most interest to us are the parameters associated with advβ  as given in equation (4). 
Focusing on the laundry detergents category, the estimated δ value of -3.341 shows that the 
‘pure’ advertising elasticity is 035.0341.3 =−e . This is in the range of advertising elasticities 
reported for branded packed goods by Leone and Schultz (1980), but is much smaller than the 
price elasticity, as expected. The estimated values of 1γ  and 2γ at 4.929 and  -0.982, 
respectively, are of the magnitude anticipated above, which result in a reverse-S shaped 
logistic distribution.  
We also fit our model using two alternative definitions of competitive clutter, one 
being the proportion of competitor brands advertising and the other being the total competitor 
GRPs, which are the two respective components of equation (5). Since these models use 
different data they are not nested within the model using equation (5) as the definition of 
competitive clutter. In nonnested cases like this Spiegelhalter et al (2003) demonstrate that is 
appropriate to use their DIC measure of model comparison, with the model having the 
smallest DIC being best. The DIC for the combined model of competitive clutter is 135.2, 
while those for the respective subcomponents are 136.8 and 135.9. We also fitted a third 
alternative model that had separate parameters for the two clutter components in equation (5), 
having 2γ and 3γ  parameters instead of just 2γ . This DIC for this model is 135.7, with the 
estimates of 2γ and 3γ  being almost identical (-.967 and -.989, respectively). Since the DIC 
values for the subcomponent-only models and the separate components model are all higher 
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than 135.2, we conclude that it is best to combine the proportion of competing brands and 
their total competing advertising volume, as done in equation (5). A similar finding occurs in 
the RTE cereals category.  
 
Adjustment of Spot TV GRPs 
Recall from our discussion of the advertising data that we use only spot TV. For 
Procter and Gamble 28% of TV ad spend is on spot TV, while the percentage for Unilever is 
30%. To examine the sensitivity of our model and results to advertising volume, we refitted 
the model in equation (7) but with the GRPs of Procter and Gamble and Unilever brands 
divided, respectively, by 0.28 and 0.3. This corrects for the shortfall in advertising volume 
that occurs due to our use of just spot TV.  
The effect of this correction can be anticipated using equation (7), where if we 
multiply itA  and itC  by a constant θ  (being say 1/0.29, the inverse of the average of 0.28 and 
0.3 spot TV proportions), the component for advertising becomes 
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where )log(21
'
1 θγγγ += . Since the first term on the right hand side is close to zero (being 
0.017 for laundry detergents), the only major change to the advertising component of 
equation (7) is that 1γ  is adjusted to become )log(21 θγγ + . The parameter estimates from 
Table 2 allow us to estimate the adjusted 1γ  as 71.3)29./1log(982.0929.4ˆ '1 =−=γ . We now 
refit the entire model in equation (7) using the adjusted values of itA  and itC . The new 
estimates of 1γ  and 2γ are, respectively, 3.72 and -1.021. These new estimates are nearly 
perfectly in line with our predictions, namely, that 1γ  changes by a factor of )log(2 θγ  
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(predicted value of 3.71 versus new estimate of 3.72) and 2γ  is largely unchanged (predicted 
value of -0.982 versus new estimate of -1.021). That is, using just spot TV does not 
materially affect the estimate of 2γ , with the significant negative effect of competitive clutter 
still being prevalent. 
Clutter’s Effect on Advertising Elasticity 
Figure 1 shows the effect of increasing competitive clutter on the advertising elasticity 
in the laundry detergent category. Clearly, beyond a competitive clutter level of exp(2)=7.4 
the advertising elasticity starts to fall quickly. Table 1a shows that the average competitive 
clutter level for this category is 133.2. At this level of clutter, Figure 1 gives an estimated 
advertising elasticity of 0.019. However, when there is no competitive clutter the advertising 
elasticity is nearly two times higher, at 0.035, showing the deleterious effects of competitive 
interference. To underscore this attenuating effect of competitive clutter, we re-estimated the 
model in equation (7), but with just a single regression-type parameter for advertising, as for 
the other marketing variables. The estimated value of the advertising elasticity in this model 
is 0.018, being very close to the 0.019 obtained at the average clutter level in Figure 1 (at the 
point log(133.2)= 4.892). What this means is that if competitive clutter effects are ignored 
and we naively estimate the advertising elasticity, a value of 0.018 is obtained, which is 
relatively low (Leone and Schultz 1980). However, the advertising elasticity without clutter is 
0.035. Clearly, competitive clutter masks the true effect advertising can have on sales.  
 
ADVERTISING AND CLUTTER EFFECTS ON SALES 
 We saw above how increasing competitive clutter levels reduces advertising elasticity 
and thereby diminishes the effect that advertising has on sales. In this section we focus on 
just advertising’s effect on sales and assume the other marketing mix factors are held 
constant. To illustrate the effect of clutter on sales we calculate the log of sales for an 
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‘average brand’ in the laundry detergent category. This is achieved by substituting the 
average of the log(price), log(price-off) and log(bonus) covariates as well as the estimated 
parameters from Table 2 into equation (1). We also use the average of the brand dummy 
variable parameter estimates to allow for the error structure in equation (2). As a reference 
point, the log of sales calculated at the average value of competitive clutter and for the 
average of log(advertising) across all the brands is 10.2. We now examine the change in the 
log of sales with respect to this reference point, which has an expected value of 
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where GRPF are the GRPs for the focal brand and C is the competitive clutter, based on the 
number of competing brands advertising and their respective GRPs. 
Equation (8) shows that when C is held constant, increasing GRPF  for the focal brand 
will increase its sales. However, the amount by which its sales increase very much depends 
on the competitive clutter, with high levels resulting in lower sales lift. Figure 2a uses 
equation (8) to plot )log(Sales∆ when just two of the seven brands are advertising, the focal 
brand and one other. The diminishing return of sales to increasing advertising for the focal 
brand is apparent. Also note that as the number of GRPs for the other brand increases, the 
sales response to advertising for the focal brand declines, but not substantially. 
 Figure 2b shows )log(Sales∆ when three other brands are advertising in addition to 
the focal brand, while Figure 2c plots )log(Sales∆  when all 6 competing brands are 
advertising simultaneously against the focal brand. The drop in )log(Sales∆  from the two-
brand situation is remarkable and highlights the dramatic effect that competitive interference 
can have on sales, especially as the proportion of brands advertising in the category increases. 
Only when the competitor brands advertise at very low levels can the focal brand expect to 
see a substantial response to their advertising. For example, when the six ‘other’ brands in 
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Figure 2c broadcast 150 total GRPs and the focal brand advertises at 50 GRPs, log sales for 
the focal brand increase by 0.027, being a 2.8% lift in sales. However, when the other six 
brands have a lower total of just 50 GRPs, matching the focal brand’s 50 GRPs, the sales lift 
for the focal brand more than doubles to 6.4%. 
 Figures 2a through 2c also illustrate that competitive interference effects are heavily 
impacted by the proportion of brands simultaneously advertising. For instance, the sales 
increase when the focal brand advertises at 50 GRPs and 6 competing brands advertise at 25 
GRPs each is 2.8%. However, for the same focal brand advertising of 50 GRPs, but when just 
3 competing brands advertise at 50 GRPs each, the sales increase rises to 5.1%. That is, even 
though in both cases the total competitive GRPs are 150, bigger sales gains due to focal brand 
advertising can be expected when fewer competitors are advertising in the same week.  
Optimal Advertising Levels Under Brand Cooperation 
 The previous section showed that even with relatively low competitor advertising 
levels, such as 25 GRPs per brand per week, there is a dramatic attenuation in the sales lift 
when the focal brand advertises. While one or more brands in a category may be intentionally 
trying to interfere with their competitors’ advertising, others may not be aware of the 
deleterious effects of over-advertising in the category. Equation (8) shows that sales increase 
as advertising for a focal brand increases, but the sales increase is reduced as competitor 
clutter increases (if 02 <γ ). In its present form, equation (8) has no functional relationship 
between a focal brand’s advertising and that of its competitors. Suppose now that, within a 
category, b of the competitor brands cooperate with the focal brand by advertising with 
exactly the same number of GRPs as the focal brand, while the remaining bB −−1  brands to 
not advertise. Denote this common advertising GRP level as A. In this situation equation (8) 
becomes, for B brands in the category and 1−≤ Bb , 
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Figure 3 is a graph of the right hand side of equation (9) for b varying from 1 to 6 and for A 
increasing upward from 5 GRPs, using the parameter estimates in Table 2 for laundry 
detergent. As previously seen, it shows that of the two components of ad clutter, the 
proportion of brands advertising in the category has a greater impact on sales attenuation than 
the number of competitive GRPs broadcast. This is illustrated by the very steep drop in 
)log(Sales∆  in going from 1 to 2 competitor brands advertising even at moderate levels of A. 
Figure 3 also shows that there is a GRP level at which each brand will maximize the 
effectiveness of advertising on sales. By setting the derivative of equation (9) to zero, the 
maximum sales response occurs at AM GRPs, which is the solution to the following equation 
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Table 4 gives the number of spot TV GRPs at which sales are maximized when b competitor 
brands in the category advertise at the same amount each week as the focal brand. The pattern 
in this table is clear, when there are many brands advertising (more than about two-thirds of 
the brands in the category), the optimal GRPs per brand is relatively low, at around 25 GRPs. 
This is generally much lower advertising weight than what we observe in the liquid laundry 
detergent category, where, for example, Table 1 shows that the average brand broadcasts 36 
GRPs per week. This indicates that current sales levels due to advertising may be suboptimal.  
 To emphasize the point that present advertising levels in the laundry detergent 
category are suboptimal we calculate the number of times that brands in the detergent 
category are within 20% of the optimal GRP level, as prescribed by Table 4. For instance, if 
there are just two brands advertising in a particular week we looked to see if each brand, on 
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average, is advertising at levels within 2092.0209 ×±  = (167, 251) GRPs. For five total 
brands (the focal brand and 4=b  competitors) the allowable interval is 262.026 ×± GRPs, 
on average, for each brand. Of course, we omit the three weeks when only one brand 
advertises since there are no competitive interference effects in that case. It transpires that 
brands advertise within this near-optimal interval in only 70 of the 7*(52-3) =343 brand-
weeks, that is, only 20.4% of brand-weeks. Even more revealing is that brands exceed the 
upper bound of the interval 59% of the time. That is, over-advertising is much more common 
than under-advertising. If the interval is generously widened to within %50± of the optimal 
GRPs in Table 4, then the optimal advertising levels are achieved in only 37% of the brand-
weeks and actual advertising levels exceed the upper bound 49% of the time. Clearly, the 
present levels of advertising in this laundry detergent category are far from that required to 
maximize the effectiveness of advertising on sales for each brand. In fact, if we substitute the 
actual GRPs per brand into A in equation (9), sales are 6.4% below those achievable when 
each brand advertises at the same optimum level. 
Share of Voice 
 It is more common for brands to advertise in proportion to their market share rather 
than equally (Schroer 1990), so that a brand’s share of voice (SOV) approximately equals its 
share of market (SOM). Figures 4a and 4b plot SOV against SOM for the laundry detergent 
and RTE cereals categories for the year of 19918. Clearly the rule of thumb that SOV should 
equal SOM is operating in these categories, with most brands falling close to the SOV=SOM 
line. Some better-known brands, such as Tide, Kellogg’s Corn Flakes and Cheerios enjoy a 
market share premium. On the other hand, Era Plus and Grape Nuts are probably trying to 
gain market share by advertising at higher levels than brands with comparable market share 
(Schroer 1990). 
                                                 
8 This time we base the SOV on the total national TV spend, not just spot TV in Chicago. 
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 Schroer (1990) claims that share gain is possible only if a brand consistently 
outspends its competitor(s) by a two-to-one ratio of SOV. Our results show that advertising 
gains can also be made if advertisers search out gaps in their competitors’ media plans. What 
is required is to identify markets where there are fewer competitor brands advertising. 
Schroer (1990) illustrates this point with an example from the beer market in Iowa. In the 
early 1980s Pabst and Old Milwaukee spent less on advertising, allowing many instances 
where Anheuser-Busch was able to advertise solely for a short time period. Hence, instead of 
three brands advertising, just one was advertising at high levels. Over a two-year period, 
Busch’s share increase by 10 percentage points while Pabst’s and Old Milwaukee’s share 
declined by 13 and 8 percentage points, respectively. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
 While previous research has found that advertising interference lowers ad recall, 
brand attitude and purchase intentions, no studies have examined the effect on sales. Our 
study addresses this shortcoming, with findings that are consistent with previous studies, 
showing that sales too are negatively impacted by competitive advertising interference. The 
result of advertising interference is attenuation in the advertising elasticity for the focal brand 
when competitors simultaneously advertise. For the liquid laundry detergent category the 
advertising elasticity is reduced by about one-half, while for RTE cereals the reduction is 
about 80%. The attenuation is worse for cereals as there are more brands and the category is 
less concentrated. Although advertisers have probably suspected that high levels of 
competitive interference reduces the effectiveness of their advertising on sales, until now the 
magnitude of the reduction has not been quantified. We now know that advertising response 
could be higher if there were less competitive interference within a category. 
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 Previous experimental studies of advertising interference have found that familiar 
brands do not have the same drop in ad recall and recognition in the presence of competitive 
interference as fictitious or lesser-known brands (Kent and Allen 1993; 1994). In contrast, we 
find this does not carry through to sales, where even everyday brands like Tide, Surf, 
Cheerios and Corn Flakes have attenuated sales response when competitive interference is 
high. 
 Of course, experienced advertisers in mature markets, of which Procter and Gamble, 
Unilever, Kellogg and General Mills are good examples, often set advertising budgets in 
proportion to a brand’s market share as part of a share maintenance strategy (Schroer 1990). 
Persistent use of the SOV=SOM strategy over the past forty years means that as one brand 
increases its SOV to gain market share its competitors have correspondingly increased their 
ad spending to maintain SOV and therefore market share. This has resulted in an escalation of 
ad spending (Metwally 1978; Schroer 1990), thereby increasing demand for advertising. The 
combination of higher demand with more channels, plus more 15 second commercials (Kent 
1993; 1995), has led to the high clutter levels we see today, not to mention the high cost of 
television advertising, with the average 30 second prime time commercial on network TV 
now costing $300,000 (Katz 2003, p. 64). This huge increase in television advertising has 
resulted in over-advertising to the point where if we compare present advertising levels with 
the optimum spend per brand, on average, brands overspend rather than under-spend each 
week by a three to one ratio. 
 As Kent (1995) comments “Advertisers can’t bring back the low-clutter television 
environment, but they can modify their tactics to increase ad effectiveness in the present 
context”. One suggestion he offers is to buy more spot and less network TV. However, spot 
TV is no panacea for interference effects, as our spot TV data in Chicago exhibit competitive 
interference of sufficient magnitude to deflate advertising response. Of course, network TV 
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has an even greater attenuation of ad response, but, nevertheless, spot TV is not immune from 
this problem.  
Since we find that the biggest driver of competitive interference is not so much the 
weight of advertising but the number of competing advertisers, a useful tactic is to anticipate 
when competitors are going to advertise and choose to advertise when they do not. An 
obvious starting point is to look at historical advertising patterns of competitors. Another 
strategy is to concentrate advertising into one- or two-day bursts within a week rather than 
spread it over the full week. Roberts (1999), using a large single-source panel in the UK, 
finds that three exposures to an ad on the same day results in a much bigger sales lift than 
having three exposures spread over three days. If competitors are spreading their advertising 
over the week then concentrating the advertising of the focal brand to one day will result in 
less competitive interference effects on that day. The key is to choose that day to be close to 
actual purchase.  
We note that many of the brands in our study are produced by large ‘umbrella’ 
manufacturers, such as Procter & Gamble and General Mills. Clearly there are opportunities 
for the various brands belonging to these manufacturers to coordinate their advertising to help 
reduce interference among their own brands. There were no obvious signs of such co-
ordination in our data, so there is scope for more mutually beneficial media planning in the 
future. 
Our findings on attenuated advertising response in the presence of competitive 
interference are sobering for advertisers. Further work can be done to extend our range of 
categories, but a consistent finding is emerging, namely, that over-advertising is substantially 
dampening advertising response. Less advertising or smarter media planning is required to 
reduce this problem. 
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Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics for the Liquid Laundry Detergents Category 
Brand 
Mkt 
Share 
Av. 
Price/¢ 
Av. 
Bonus 
Av. 
Price-
off 
Weeks of 
advertising 
Av. 
Spots/ 
week 
Av. 
GRPs/ 
week 
Av. 
itC  
         
All 11.1 71.4 79.1 3.3 21 3.5 25 147.1
Cheer 5.9 103.1 24.0 4.1 14 2.1 8 154.2
Cheer Free 5.6 104.2 21.9 3.1 7 0.5 2 164.7
Era Plus 8.5 102.9 38.4 0 46 16.8 65 103.2
Solo 11.5 86.9 20.6 3.1 38 15.3 63 105.8
Surf 11.9 97.6 58.2 2.8 29 5.4 36 130.2
Tide 45.5 101.4 138.7 7.7 20 11.2 49 127.1
    
ALL BRANDS 100.0 95.4 54.3 3.4 26 7.8 36 133.2
 
 
Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics for the RTE Cereals Category  
Manufacturer/ 
Brand 
Mkt 
Share 
Av. 
Price/$ 
Av. 
Bonus 
Av. 
Price-
off 
Weeks of 
advertising 
Av. 
Spots/ 
week 
Av. 
GRPs/ 
week 
Av. 
itC  
General Mills         
Cheerios      
-Apple cinnamon 5.5 3.22 7.64 0.00 47 19.7 55.9 136.1
-Cheerios 16.5 3.33 10.91 0.00 49 30.3 87.7 122.6
-Honey nut 11.3 3.26 18.68 2.53 49 28.0 81.4 125.1
         
Total Corn Flakes 1.5 4.37 0.00 0.00 31 6.3 18.3 154.9
Wheaties 6.9 2.77 15.89 0.00 45 5.8 24.1 148.2
         
Ralston         
Corn Chex 2.0 3.43 10.43 0.92 6 0.1 0.6 175.9
Double Chex 1.8 2.62 3.34 0.00 4 1.3 10.0 172.0
Rice Chex 2.5 3.42 17.21 0.91 11 1.5 10.2 168.8
         
Kelloggs         
All Bran 1.9 2.36 0.00 0.00 8 0.2 1.5 174.5
Bran Flakes 2.7 2.32 7.94 0.00 3 0.1 0.1 176.6
Corn Flakes 17.6 1.81 18.85 2.40 37 5.8 18.5 153.7
Crispix 4.2 3.39 3.74 0.02 1 0.0 0.0 178.0
Kenmei  2.4 2.62 3.34 0.00 4 0.1 0.7 176.3
Product 19 2.4 3.64 3.98 0.00 6 0.2 0.7 174.9
Special K 6.8 3.46 5.91 0.49 6 0.1 0.5 175.2
         
Post Foods         
Grape Nuts 7.9 2.15 5.72 0.00 46 9.3 32.2 145.1
Bran Flakes 2.0 2.35 2.70 0.00 1 0.0 0.2 177.8
         
Quaker Foods         
Oat Squares 4.1 2.56 11.11 0.00 32 10.2 52.1 141.4
    
ALL BRANDS 100.0 $2.95 8.2 0.4 21.4 6.6 21.9 159.8
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates for the Sales Response Model for Laundry Detergent 
  
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-statistic 
0β  10.860 0.109 99.6 
priceβ  -3.374 0.452 -7.5 
bonusβ  0.031 0.015 2.1 
priceoffβ  0.115 0.031 3.7 
δ  -3.341 0.549 -6.1 
1γ  4.929 0.976 5.1 
2γ  -0.982 0.429 -2.3 ρ  0.264 0.048 5.5 
2σ  0.079   
Brand intercepts:    
All -1.382 0.230 -6.0 
Cheer -1.245 0.121 -10.3 
Cheer Free -1.224 0.122 -10.0 
Era Plus -0.977 0.113 -8.6 
Solo -1.140 0.133 -8.6 
Surf -0.996 0.109 -9.1 
Tide 0.000 - - 
    
Log-likelihood (full model) -59.9   
Log-likelihood (null model) -591.0   
DIC 135.2   
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 Table 3: Parameter Estimates for the Sales Response Model for RTE Cereals 
  
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-statistic 
0β  10.660 .212 50.3
priceβ  -2.453 .198 -12.4
bonusβ  .063 .017 3.7
priceoffβ  .154 .039 3.9
δ  -2.778 .845 -3.3
1γ  3.384 1.280 2.6
2γ  -1.003 .418 -2.4ρ  .218 .028 7.8
2σ  .068 - 
Brand intercepts:   
Cheerios –Apple Cinnamon .270 .064 4.2
Cheerios –Cereal 1.100 .081 13.6
Cheerios –Honey Nut  .824 .073 11.3
Total Cereal-Corn -.129 .089 -1.4
Wheaties Cereal-Regular .00 -  
    
Chex Cereals-Corn -.534 .071 -7.5
Chex Cereals-Double Chex -1.185 .073 -16.2
Chex Cereals-Rice -.315 .069 -4.6
    
Kelloggs-All Bran -1.117 .076 -14.7
Kelloggs-Bran Flakes -.885 .073 -12.1
Kelloggs-Corn Flakes .010 .090 0.1
Kelloggs-Crispix Cereal .151 .067 2.3
Kelloggs-Kenmei Rice Bran -.820 .067 -12.2
Kelloggs-Product 19 -.123 .071 -1.7
Kelloggs-Special K .596 .071 8.4
    
Post Food-Grape Nuts -.227 .075 -3.0
Post Food-Natural Bran Flakes -1.173 .078 -15.0
    
Quaker Food-Oat Squares Cereal -.379 .064 -5.9
   
    
Log-likelihood (full model) -86.0   
Log-likelihood (null model) -1222.2   
DIC 180.6   
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Table 4: Optimal number of spot TV GRPs per brand per week when b competing brands 
advertise at the same GRP level as the focal brand – laundry detergents 
b 1 2 3 4 5 6
Optimal GRPs per brand 209 70 38 26 19 15
Optimal total GRPs in category 418 210 152 130 114 105
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Figure1: Advertising Elasticity for Increasing Competive Clutter Levels
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Figure 2c: ∆ Log(Sales) When Seven Brands are Advertising
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Figure 2b: ∆ Log(Sales) When Four Brands are Advertising
 
5
2
0
3
5
5
0
6
5
8
0
9
5
1
1
0
1
2
5
1
4
0
1
5
5
1
7
0
1
8
5
5
40
75
110
145
180
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
∆ Log(sales)
GRPs for Other Brand
GRPs for Focal Brand
Figure 2a: ∆ Log(Sales) When Two Brands are Advertising
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Figure 3: ∆ Log(Sales) as a Function of GRPs per Brand and Number of Brands Advertising
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Figure 4a: Market Share Against Share of Voice - Laundry Detergent
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Figure 4b: Market Share Against Share of Voice - RTE Cereals
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